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ABSTRACT
Half a decade after Bitcoin became the first widely used
cryptocurrency, blockchains are receiving considerable in-
terest from industry and the research community. Modern
blockchains feature services such as name registration and
smart contracts. Some employ new forms of consensus, such
as proof-of-stake instead of proof-of-work. However, these
blockchains are so far relatively poorly investigated, despite
the fact that they move considerable assets. In this paper, we
explore three representative, modern blockchains—Ethereum,
Namecoin, and Peercoin. Our focus is on the features that
set them apart from the pure currency use case of Bitcoin.
We investigate the blockchains’ activity in terms of trans-
actions and usage patterns, identifying some curiosities in
the process. For Ethereum, we are mostly interested in the
smart contract functionality it offers. We also carry out a
brief analysis of issues that are introduced by negligent de-
sign of smart contracts. In the case of Namecoin, our focus
is how the name registration is used and has developed over
time. For Peercoin, we are interested in the use of proof-
of-stake, as this consensus algorithm is poorly understood
yet used to move considerable value. Finally, we relate the
above to the fundamental characteristics of the underlying
peer-to-peer networks. We present a crawler for Ethereum
and give statistics on the network size. For Peercoin and
Namecoin, we identify the relatively small size of the net-
works and the weak bootstrapping process.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Net-
work Protocols; C.2.4 [Computer-Communication
Networks]: Distributed Systems
General Terms
Measurement, Experimentation, Human Factors
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of Nakamoto’s Bitcoin in 2008 [14], a
diverse range of blockchain implementations have emerged.
The common goal of blockchain-based technologies is to
decentralise control of a particular asset, typically re-
placing one or a small set of trusted central entities with
a network of untrusted nodes. A majority of these nodes
need to act faithfully to the respective blockchain pro-
tocol in order to secure the operation of the blockchain
as a whole.
Bitcoin’s asset is the Bitcoin currency (BTC) and the
trusted centralised entity it attempts to replace is the
traditional bank. Newer blockchains provide more intri-
cate features, such as Namecoin’s attempt at providing
decentralised name registration, or Ethereum’s globally
distributed Ethereum Virtual Machine that allows ex-
ecuting code in the form of so-called smart contracts
on the Ethereum network. Perceptions of blockchains
are varied, with opinions ranging from highly sceptical
to enthusiastic. Success of the technology would have
broad implications for legislation, policy-making, and
financial processes, due to the inherently decentralised
nature of the technology. We believe it is too early to
make a definitive call; however, blockchains are already
used to move assets on a large scale. Now is the time to
investigate them: at the time of writing, the total value
of all existing bitcoin currency equates roughly USD 7B;
Ethereum’s Ether follows in second place with approx-
imately USD 750M1.
In this paper, we carry out analyses for three block-
chains that have considerably extended Bitcoin’s origi-
nal mechanism. Ethereum has added a Turing-complete
scripting language that makes it possible to define pro-
grams that are executed by participants of the blockchain.
Namecoin has added a decentralised name registration
service. Peercoin, finally, has made a switch to a new
consensus mechanism to ensure the security of the blockchain,
namely proof-of-stake. For the blockchains whose asset
is a service that is provided in a decentralised fashion—
Namecoin and Ethereum—we focus on how the service
is used and supported by the blockchain. An analy-
sis of Ethereum is one of our main contributions: we
show the development of the blockchain and give fun-
damental statistics that describe its use. In particular,
we explore the smart contracts and uncover oddities,
including some security-related (so far low-impact) is-
sues. We also provide a first analysis of similarity be-
1Data from http://coinmarketcap.com/ on 3/5/2016.
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tween contracts on the blockchain, which gives hints at
how they have been developed. For the ‘pure-currency’
blockchain, Peercoin, we investigate how much the new
proof-of-stake algorithm is involved in moving currency
around. Finally, we investigate briefly some core prop-
erties of the networks that keep these blockchains run-
ning, including peer crawling data and tests of the boot-
strapping process.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.
In the next section, we provide the necessary back-
ground to understand the blockchains we investigate
and discuss previous related work. Section 3 presents
our methodology and provides an overview of our data
sets. Section 4 presents our results for Ethereum, Name-
coin, and Peercoin. We offer our conclusions in Section
5.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
We provide the necessary background on blockchain
technology in this section and discuss related work.
2.1 Background
A blockchain is an append-only, public ledger that
keeps track of transactions relating to an asset. In Bit-
coin, for instance, a transaction is the transfer of some
amount of Bitcoin currency (BTC) from one account
to another. An account is expressed as a public key;
ownership of the corresponding private key proves own-
ership of the account. Transactions are grouped into
blocks, which are cryptographically linked—i.e., block
n contains a hash value of block n − 1. Transactions
are digitally signed: only the holder of the private key
can create a valid signature, but all participants of the
blockchain can verify its validity with the known pub-
lic key2. All participants maintain the entire history
of the blockchain, and in most blockchains every par-
ticipant knows the ownership status of all assets and
all accounts. However, one typically does not know the
identity of an account owner by only looking at this
data.
A serious problem that all early crypto-currency pro-
posals shared was the need to maintain a trusted au-
thority that could issue cryptographic coins and track
transactions so as to ensure that no digital coin could
be spent twice, and that the payer is able to transact
if her balance permits. One of Bitcoin’s declared goals
was to remove this central authority. The key insight
was that double-spending can be prevented if all partic-
ipants in the digital currency are able to maintain the
same, correct view of all transactions in the network.
Proof-of-work Bitcoin introduced the blockchain as
a cryptographic ledger that stores all transactions ever
made. Bitcoin nodes relay transactions to all nodes that
2Keys are based on elliptic-curve cryptography and are thus
short and suitable for inclusion in the blockchain.
they are connected to. This is insufficient to prevent
double-spending, however, as an attacker could always
try to partition the network and spend the same coin in-
dependently in each partition. Hence, Bitcoin requires
all nodes to achieve consensus regarding which trans-
actions have been made or rejected, e.g., due to insuf-
ficient balance. This is solved by block mining. Nodes
collect transactions into a block and compute a hash
over the whole block, together with a nonce of their
choosing. A block will only be accepted by the entire
network if the hash value, interpreted as a number, is
smaller than a given target value, which depends on the
previous blocks’ hash values, and which each node can
compute independently and deterministically.
When a miner finds a valid hash, the block header
containing the valid hash is announced to the network.
Other miners in the network then validate the new block
header before accepting it. Acceptance is indicated by
miners starting to work on subsequent blocks, incorpo-
rating the newly mined block as the parent. To mine a
block, a node must thus invest computational resources
to find a nonce that when used in the hashing process
will yield the necessary block hash.
It may occasionally happen that two miners find a
block at the same time (a ‘fork’). In that case, the
blockchain is not ‘in consensus’ until the next block is
found, which takes one of the two candidates as its cho-
sen previous block. The new, longest blockchain is then
accepted by the network as the ‘consensus view’.
By requiring not just one, but a number of blocks to
have been found since the first inclusion of a transac-
tion, it becomes exceedingly unlikely that an attacker is
able to forge a different, longer blockchain that contains
a different set of transactions: to change a transaction
in an already confirmed block, one must recompute the
hashes for all subsequent blocks. Bitcoin’s author sug-
gested that an attacker would need to control strictly
more than 50% of the network’s computational power
for this attack to succeed [14], although more recent re-
search has identified attacks that succeed with less [6].
A major assumption is that miners are incentivised to
act faithfully. As a reward for mining a block, a miner
may assign a certain amount of thus newly generated
currency to itself in the new block. In Bitcoin, the ex-
act amount is currently 25 BTC and this reward halves
at certain intervals (52,500 blocks), with the next halv-
ing expected to occur in July 2016. Senders of trans-
actions may also choose to pay transaction fees that
the block miner can claim. The input of a transaction
must be the output of a previous transaction (except
for the aforementioned currency generation). The out-
put is one or more currency values with the public keys
of the receivers, all signed by the sender. If the output
value is lower than the input value, the miner can claim
the difference; a transaction fee. With block rewards
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halving, the reward for mining will ultimately consist
of only transaction fees. Mining pools The difficulty
in finding new blocks can grow rapidly with every new
block as the target difficulty is dynamically adjusted.
Participants first switched to GPUs for increased com-
putational power (over CPUs) and then to specialised
hardware (ASICs)—but the energy costs are still very
high [15]. One way to participate in the network while
still realising a profit is participation in a mining pool.
A mining pool is an organisation that distributes a por-
tion of the mining workload to individual participants
and shares the block reward amongst all participants
when a block is mined by just one participant in the
pool. The drawback of a mining pool is that it intro-
duces a form of centralisation: particularly large mining
pools may, when they collude, hold more than 50% of
the network’s computational power.
Namecoin Bitcoin uses a scripting language to ex-
press how a transaction output can be claimed. Bit-
coin’s scripting language was extended by Namecoin to
allow name registration. A sender can invest currency
(NMC) to request a mapping of a name to some value
to be stored in the blockchain. There are three pri-
mary operations. name_new announces the intention to
register a name by providing a hash value of the de-
sired name in a transaction3. This transaction carries
a special fee of 0.01 NMC. A name_new is followed by
a name_firstupdate, which costs a fixed fee of 0.005
NMC plus the so-called network fee, which is a quasi-
linear function in the number of blocks and decreases
over time. The network fee was high in the beginning
(50 NMC when Namecoin started on 19 April 2011) and
dropped to (rounded) zero in November 20124. Names
expire (currently after 250 days) and can be renewed;
they can also be transferred. Renewal and transfer
are done with the name_update operation, whose fee is
0.005 NMC. Namecoin is built off the Bitcoin code and
continues to import code from the Bitcoin repository5.
Merge mining Namecoin also introduced merge min-
ing whereby miners can participate in two blockchains
at once. This is a response to a persistently relatively
small number of dedicated (Namecoin-only) miners. The
Namecoin software was changed to accept Bitcoin blocks
as valid, too. Miners carrying out merged mining can
collect Namecoin transactions, hash them, and include
this hash value in a normal Bitcoin block. If the miner
finds a block that meets only Namecoin’s target diffi-
culty, the block is sent for incorporation to the Name-
coin network only. If the block also meets Bitcoin’s
target—which is more difficult to achieve than Namecoin’s—
3A hash value is announced to avoid another participant
deciding to race for the name.
4The intention of the network fee was to discourage early
mass-registration.
5The last full commit that Bitcoin and Namecoin share is
from 6 May 2016.
the block is sent to both networks, and the miner can
profit twice. The Bitcoin network ignores the extra
data, but the Namecoin blockchain stores Bitcoin’s data.
The drawback of merge mining is that it can introduce
a strong dependency of one blockchain on another.
Peercoin: proof-of-stake Proof-of-work is wasteful
as the entire network participates in the mining process.
Estimates in 2014 found the Bitcoin network’s electric-
ity consumption to be on par with that of Ireland [15].
Other consensus-building forms have been investigated,
with proof-of-stake arguably being the most interest-
ing. The idea of proof-of-stake is to assign the right
to mine a block not based on finding a certain hash
value but on being able to demonstrate that the miner
holds a certain stake in the network, such as ‘coin-age’,
i.e., a certain amount of currency held for a certain
number of days. Peercoin uses this form of proof-of-
stake. A special function in the code determines which
miners have a right to mine the next block for a given
‘stake’. A miner who mines a block resets the coin-age
for the stake to 0 and must accumulate it again before
being allowed to mine a block. Peercoin does not have
transaction fees; rewards are only given out for mining
blocks. Peercoin is not entirely proof-of-stake-based: its
codebase switches over gradually from proof-of-work in
Bitcoin fashion to proof-of-stake. The software is built
off a relatively old version of Bitcoin of June 20126.
Ethereum: smart contracts Ethereum’s currency
is Ether. Ethereum added a novelty to blockchains:
its scripting language is Turing-complete and allows to
define smart contracts. These are small applications
that are executed by the entire network. The author
of a smart contract offers a certain reward for execut-
ing the code: she defines an amount of ‘gas’ she is
willing to spend, together with an exchange rate from
Ether to gas. Smart contracts can be relatively com-
plex; they can even instantiate other sub-contracts and
can have storage. This makes it possible to imple-
ment various forms of contractual agreement, expressed
in code. Smart contracts are written (currently) in
the high-level languages Solidity or Serpent. Mining in
Ethereum currently implements a proof-of-work model
using a specialised hashing algorithm called Ethash.
Prior to the software release of Ethereum, 72 million
Ether was pre-mined and shared amongst the Ethereum
foundation and early investors. Ethereum intends to
switch to proof-of-stake, which allows it to create an
unlimited supply of Ether.
2.2 Related work
There is a body of work on Bitcoin, both for its formal
properties as well as the data stored in the blockchain.
6The last full commit that Bitcoin and Peercoin share
is 397737b9133118d71d2c8ba6a95afea0ba7d4350 of April
2012; the last cherry-picked commit is from 20 August 2012.
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Other blockchains seem to have received much less at-
tention, with Peercoin and Ethereum apparently still
entirely unexplored.
Bonneau et al. provide a description of Bitcoin’s tech-
nical details and outline major challenges and research
directions in [4]. In [1], Barber et al. also analyse Bit-
coin in depth, identify some structural weaknesses, and
propose forms of remediation. A critical property of
Bitcoin is that it assumes miners are incentivised not
to collude and execute the protocol faithfully. In [6],
Eyal and Sirer describe Selfish Mining, a strategy that
a mining pool can follow to obtain more revenue than
its share of overall computational power suggests. The
strategy does not depend on the size of the misbehaving
mining pool. The authors propose a change to Bitcoin
that does not eliminate the flaw entirely but requires
a mining pool to hold at least 25% of the computa-
tional power of the network in order for the strategy
to succeed. Karame et al. [9] were the first to analyse
the window of opportunity for double-spending Bitcoins
that is open when there is an insufficient number of con-
firmations to ascertain that a transaction has been ac-
cepted by the network. Their findings highlighted how
careful one has to be in accepting Bitcoin transactions
as a basis for the transfer of real-world assets. Decker
and Wattenhofer [5] analysed the propagation of Bit-
coin messages in the network and showed the relevance
of network delay to increase the chance of a blockchain
fork. Interestingly, Bitcoin was not designed to be an
anonymous system. Although it is possible to use a dif-
ferent public/private key pair for every transaction, it
is still possible to match these to real-world entities by
a probabilistic argument. Meiklejohn et al. [12] used a
number of heuristics and scraping of Web sites (to ob-
tain Bitcoin addresses) to show that actors in Bitcoin
can be identified by their transactions and purchases
they make. Ron and Shamir, finally, provide an analy-
sis of the Bitcoin transaction graph in [16]. Our work
shares some methodical aspects with these analyses, but
focuses on the innovations that Ethereum, Namecoin,
and Peercoin introduced.
Kalodner et al. provided a first analysis of Name-
coin in [8]. The authors’ focus was on the use of the
namespace and on the development of an appropriate
model for decentralised namespaces. They found only
28 names in Namecoin that did not appear to be ‘squat-
ted’ (registered entirely for the purpose of transferring
them later for a lucrative price). Our focus in this pa-
per is very different: we investigate the blockchain with
respect to the merge-mining property and its develop-
ment over time.
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA SETS
We chose the following three blockchains for our anal-
yses: Namecoin, Peercoin, and Ethereum. Namecoin
Blockchain Size on Disk Avg. Growthper Day
Bitcoin 73.0 GB 27.0 MB
Namecoin 3.0 GB 1.5 MB
Peercoin 0.5 GB 0.5 MB
Ethereum 17.0 GB 64.5 MB
Table 2: Summary of blockchain statistics.
was chosen as it was the first blockchain to introduce a
non-financial service, namely name registration, and be-
cause it was also the first blockchain to support merge
mining with Bitcoin. Peercoin was chosen because it
was the first blockchain to introduce proof-of-stake, al-
beit in a hybrid fashion. Ethereum was the first blockchain
to introduce a Turing-complete scripting language, with
support for smart contracts, and is the most active and
representative blockchain of its kind.
There are two parts to our methodology. To gain a
comprehensive picture of transactions in each blockchain,
we downloaded and analysed the blockchains themselves.
To gain a first understanding of the underlying peer-to-
peer networks, we analysed their bootstrapping process
and carried out a crawl.
3.1 Blockchain download
We compiled each reference client from source, at
the latest revision available at the time our study be-
gan, and from the master branch of the repositories:
namecoin-core7, ppcoin8, and ethereum9.
For our study, we only considered blocks with a times-
tamp less than 18 April 09:59:59 UTC (17 April 23:59:59
UTC-11), but we ran each client for a further 24 hours
to ensure consensus was established. A summary of
this is provided in Table 1. We extracted data from the
blockchains either via the JSON-RPCs that each dae-
mon provided (namecoind, ppcoind) or directly from
the data structure on disk (in the case of Ethereum,
with geth as a client). Where applicable, we used the
RPC calls or provided APIs to decode or compute cer-
tain additional values (e.g., decoding Namecoin scripts
or computing transaction fees). We use the PostgreSQL
database to store and query our data. Our code is
available from Github10. Table 2 provides an overview
of storage requirements for the blockchains we anal-
ysed. We added Bitcoin for comparison, which is by far
the largest blockchain. The two Bitcoin-based deriva-
7https://github.com/namecoin, at revision
5624a2233facea2cd6785954999b46a40b8362ac
8https://github.com/ppcoin/ppcoin, at revision
f01ccea4b515ce6e01f4a50cc6b50a4f3337c7ee
9https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum, at revision
9e323d65b20c32ab1db40e8dde7172826e0e9c45
10github.com/modernblockchains
4
Blockchain First block time Block cut-off time Block cut-offindex No. TX TX volume
Namecoin 2011-04-19 12:59:40 2016-04-18 09:32:24 281,950 3,926,035 1.46× 109 NMC
Peercoin 2012-08-20 04:19:16 2016-04-18 09:44:20 232,405 965,105 1.29× 109 PPC
Ethereum 2015-07-30 15:26:28 2016-04-18 09:59:22 1,358,548 3,470,861 2.05× 108 ETH
Table 1: Summary of blockchains studied in this paper. Note that we give the timestamp of the first conventionally
mined block. The genesis blocks, i.e., block 0, were often mined days before the official release of the blockchain.
tions Peercoin and Namecoin need only a fraction of
the space. This is due to the much lower number of
transactions.
3.2 Blockchain networks
Ethereum uses a variant of the Kademlia/Kad proto-
col [11]. Instead of forwarding messages and providing
a DHT-service, the protocol is only used for peer dis-
covery. The node distance metrics used in Ethereum
differ from the traditional Kademlia XOR metrics by
the fact that SHA3 [2] is used to modify peer selection
in the discovery process. The discovery protocol oper-
ates by transmitting a FIND_NODE query with a NodeId
parameter, which is the node ID (public key) of the
client that is querying. The receiver hashes the NodeId
using SHA3, i.e. TargetHash = SHA3(NodeId). Then,
it computes the hashes of all its known peers and per-
forms the XOR operation on all the computed hashes
with TargetHash. Finally, the receiver sorts the results
in ascending order and selects the top 16 of the peers.
We implemented a Kad crawler to gather peers using
a recursive process of issuing FindNode queries. We
modified the original geth client for this to carry out
the recursive queries and log all replies. This ensures
that our crawler uses valid protocol messages.
As described, a query with TargetID will result in
getting peers whose SHA3 hash of the NodeID starts
with the same prefix as our supplied TargetID—if the
queried peer has such peers in their database. The al-
gorithm for our crawler is shown in Algorithm 1. We
add a peer to our set of known peers if we are able to
exchange the so-called PING-PONG messages—these are
a necessary part of the protocol before one can send a
FIND_NODE message. We log unsuccessful attempts to
establish a connection.
Our algorithm requires the pre-computation of TargetIDs
for a number of prefixes (we chose a 13 bit prefix to cover
the address space well). This can be simply done by re-
peatedly creating an array of 64 bytes as the TargetID
and forward-computing the value it hashes to when re-
ceived by a peer.
Namecoin and Peercoin use a much simpler peer dis-
covery. Peers keep track of all peers they have en-
countered, together with a timestamp, and connect to
a number of them. We did not investigate the net-
Algorithm 1: Kad Crawler Algorithm
Input: a set of peers from local DB, KnownPeers
Output: KnownPeers, a set of peers
1 TargetIDs ← Precompute SHA3 as described
2 for all TargetID in TargetIDs do
3 for all peer in KnownPeers do
4 send FIND_NODE(TargetID) query to peer
5 peers ← query response (max. 16 peers)
6 for all p in peers do
7 if p /∈ KnownPeers then
8 ping-pong p
9 if success then
10 KnownPeers.add(p)
11 end if
12 end if
13 end for
14 end for
15 end for
works systematically: some information is already pub-
licly available [3]. However, we investigated the boot-
strapping process for all three blockchain networks. In
the case of Namecoin and Peercoin, the official clients
ship with both hard-coded IP addresses as well as DNS
names that, when looked up, return seed IPs. To simu-
late a normal bootstrap process (with DNS caching ef-
fects), we queried the DNS names several times. In the
case of Ethereum, the IP addresses and public keys for
four seed nodes are hard-coded into the official client.
4. RESULTS
We first present a comparison of global statistics and
then discuss our results for each blockchain.
4.1 Comparison of blockchains
It is instructive to analyse how our blockchains com-
pare to each other. Figure 1 shows the number of trans-
actions that they include in blocks (and thus accept),
by month. We added data for Bitcoin from the Coin-
desk public service11. The figure shows that Bitcoin is
much more active (note the logarithmic y axis). Start-
ing with meagre beginnings in 2009, it has grown to
11http://www.coindesk.com/price/
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Month Tx. toAccounts
Tx. to
Contracts
Tx. create
Contracts
2015 Aug 76,707 5866 746
2015 Sep 165,117 7261 1087
2015 Oct 190,867 11,679 1519
2015 Nov 207,419 26,229 1265
2015 Dec 212,679 132,081 1526
2016 Jan 278,566 121,846 1735
2016 Feb 434,222 78,810 3889
2016 Mar 792,248 113,984 4551
2016 Apr 522,558 74,675 1729
Table 3: Transaction counts Ethereum by type and
month.
process millions of transactions a month12. Namecoin
is almost two orders of magnitude less active: we can
identify a strong period at the beginning in 2011, fol-
lowed by a drop at the end of the year and then stabil-
isation starting in 2012. Despite a short peak in 2015,
it has remained at roughly the same level. Peercoin
shares this fate: a strong start, and then stabilisation
at a level two entire orders of magnitude below Bitcoin.
However, the number of transactions still translates to
a serious movement of assets. Ethereum is clearly the
star among the newcomers. It started in 2015, but its
transaction count is climbing fast and it is just one order
of magnitude below Bitcoin.
4.2 Ethereum
We begin with an investigation of Ethereum. Ta-
ble 3 shows the number of transactions per month in
Ethereum, grouped by transaction type. Despite Ethereum
being primarily intended to run smart contracts, we
can see that contract-related activity is much less pro-
nounced than ordinary currency transfer13. The num-
ber of transactions whose destination address is a con-
tract (i.e., implying interaction with a contract) is ap-
proximately 15% of the quantity of transactions des-
tined for regular accounts. The number of contract cre-
ation transactions is rising, but compared to the overall
transaction count it remains small. Evidently users are
not making very good use of smart contracts yet but
use Ethereum as another currency. Note, however, that
contract creation can fail due to programming mistakes
or insufficient gas in the transaction. We discuss this
below.
4.2.1 Smart contracts
12The drop at the end is due to the month of April not being
completed, not a drop in transactions.
13Once again note that we stopped recording data on 18
April; there is no considerable drop in the number of trans-
actions compared to March.
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Figure 2: The lifespan of terminated contracts mea-
sured in number of blocks.
At our cut-off time, we found a total of 19,528 con-
tracts in the blockchain. 17,424 (89.2%) were created
by transactions directly, which implies creation by an
Ethereum client and hence most likely a human ac-
tor. 2104 (10.8%) contracts were created by other con-
tracts. Contracts can be terminated with a special op-
code (SUICIDE)—of the contracts we had found, 18,105
(92.7%) were active, and 1423 (7.3%) terminated. The
active contracts had a balance of 3.7M Ether between
them. Most of the terminated contracts had no bal-
ance left, with the exception of 260, where 98 had a
minuscule balance of ≤ 100 Wei (1 Wei is 10−18 Ether).
However, the remaining 162 contracts have a balance of
5440 Ether together—with 5273 Ether held by just ten.
At the time of writing, 1 Ether is evaluated at roughly
USD 9, so this translates to about USD 45,000 lost as
this Ether can never be retrieved. We return to the
topic of such lost money below.
We investigated the lifetimes for terminated contracts,
i.e., the time between their creation and their termina-
tion. Figure 2 shows the result. The lifetime is ex-
pressed in blocks; the average time between two blocks
in Ethereum is between 14–17 seconds. As can be seen,
many of the terminated contracts had rather short lives:
60% of them lasted for only 100 blocks, and another 20%
for about 10,000 blocks.
Zombie Contracts.
A contract creation transaction is defined by setting
the ‘to’ field to null. Typically, this type of transaction
would include some compiled EVM code in the ‘input’
field, which would then be executed to create a new con-
tract. An ‘endowment’ of gas is often provided which
provides the new contract with a positive balance upon
initialisation. If a transaction is submitted to the net-
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Figure 1: Number of transactions seen per month for each blockchain, plotted on a logarithmic y-axis.
work with a blank ‘to’ field and an empty ‘input’ field,
a contract will be created which has no EVM code. It
is safe to assume that this is almost never intentional
since these contracts lack code that defines their oper-
ation and hence they cannot perform any actions. The
Ether that the contract was endowed with is lost for-
ever. We call these ‘zombie contracts’.
We identified 395 such contracts in Ethereum. Their
balances amount to 5428 Ether, 97% of which (5274
Ether) belongs to the top 10 (ranked by balance). The
highest balance in a single one of these contracts is 2400
Ether, which at the time of writing means USD 21,600.
We originally hypothesised that these errors happened
more frequently in the early days of Ethereum; however,
this is not so. The median block number for all contract
creation transactions is 994,493. Of the 395 zombie con-
tracts, 188 were created in blocks before and including
block number 994,493; 207 contracts were created after.
Evidently, the mistake still happens. Figure 3 shows a
cumulative distribution function of all zombie contracts,
plotted by block number. The quasi-linear distribution
reinforces that this apparent mistake is a regular occur-
rence throughout Ethereum’s short history.
We speculate that the zombie contracts were acciden-
tally created by users of geth (a command line client)
while attempting to send Ether in a transaction. When
constructing a transaction, it is necessary to enter a long
string of characters. Due to the amount of scrolling in-
volved, this can lead to the sender inadvertently omit-
ting the ‘to’ field.
An exception to the linear increase in zombie con-
tracts is a spike around block 1,260,882, which is caused
by 127 zombie contracts being created by a single Ethereum
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Figure 3: CDF: zombie contract creation, plotted
against block number.
address. We have no plausible hypothesis why this hap-
pened.
Contracts referenced before creation.
We discovered a curious pattern where a smart con-
tract is sent Ether prior to its creation. We found 10
examples of this pattern. When a contract is created,
it assumes a particular Ethereum address that is subse-
quently used to interact with that contract. This con-
tract address is calculated with a deterministic function
that depends only on details of the creator’s Ethereum
account (defined by equation 82 in [17]). It is therefore
possible to pre-compute all potential contract addresses
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that a particular account is able to create.
The reason for this pattern is unclear to us. Without
knowing who the address owners are, one can only spec-
ulate. It may simply be the result of experimentation
with the blockchain; however, a more intriguing specu-
lation is that this is a weak form of ‘security by obscu-
rity’ with the intention to hide ownership of Ether. An
individual could start by generating a new Ethereum
account, then calculate the contract addresses that can
be created by the new account. Finally, she may send
Ether to one of those contract addresses, without actu-
ally creating a contract at that address. Naïve inspec-
tion of the individual’s accounts would lead observers to
believe they have a zero balance. It would also allow the
individual to receive Ether from other sources, without
the contract address being easily linkable to her iden-
tity. When the individual wants to redeem the balance,
she would only need to create a contract at the address
and provide code that simply pays the entire balance to
an account of her choosing.
4.2.2 Security analysis of smart contracts
Smart contracts can be terminated with the SUICIDE
command (opcode 0xff as specified in [17]), which must
be called from within a contract that is to be termi-
nated. A smart contract should first check if the caller is
authorised to execute the SUICIDE command, however
responsibility for this check is left to the programmer
of the smart contract. This is an example of necessi-
tated defensive programming in Solidity, also described
in [13]. We investigated how many Ethereum smart
contracts have an unprotected SUICIDE command that
can be activated by an unauthorised party. For this
purpose, we cloned the Ethereum blockchain and ran a
private copy that does not interfere with the real net-
work.
A SUICIDE command, by the Ethereum specification,
refunds all the remaining balance that is held by a con-
tract to a specific address. This address can be speci-
fied by a parameter passed to the SUICIDE command,
which could be the creator of the contract, the message
sender, a hard-coded address, or a calculated address.
A function call costs a base amount of 21,000 gas for
the call itself, plus any additional gas that is consumed
by the opcodes present in the function. The SUICIDE
command provides a gas refund of 24,000 gas. It is one
of only two commands that provide a refund; the other
is used to set a storage value in a smart contract from
non-zero to zero. Any method that uses less than 21,000
gas is likely to have called the SUICIDE command.
In order to cause contracts to execute the SUICIDE
command, it is necessary to call a function within the
smart contract that contains that command. To call a
function within a contract, one simply sends a trans-
action to the contract with the ‘input’ field set to the
signature of a function. This signature is the hash of the
function name as it appeared in the source code. Since
one cannot simply read the function names from the
compiled EVM code, we first had to determine which
functions could be called to achieve our desired out-
come. We did this with a dictionary attack by trying
commonly used words that may be used as function
names for contract termination, e.g. ‘kill’, ‘terminate’,
‘destroy’.
We then analysed all active contracts and called Ethereum’s
estimateGas method with our potential SUICIDE func-
tion calls. This allowed us to leverage our gas con-
sumption metric (see above) without actually sending
transactions. Any function call with a gas consump-
tion estimate of less than 21,000 was considered to be
a potentially vulnerable contract. After identifying a
small subset of potentially vulnerable smart contract
functions (using our function name guessing method),
we then queried historical data from the Ethereum pub-
lic blockchain to identify function signatures that were
used to terminate contracts. We then used some of these
signatures to further identify additional active contracts
that are vulnerable. After identifying a contract that
was potentially vulnerable, we invoked the function on
that particular contract and checked whether the we did
indeed terminate the contract. We also observed the ac-
count to which the contract sent its remaining balance,
if any.
We analysed the 18,105 active contracts and found
that 816 (4.5%) are vulnerable to at least one of the 14
function signatures that we use.
The total balance of these 816 contracts is only 0.285
Ether. No contracts could be terminated with the method
names suicide, end, destroy, done, delete, redeem,
or terminate. One contract had a remove method, but
a zero balance. 754 contracts were vulnerable to the
kill method. Out of these, 728 had a zero balance.
We also identified 58 contracts that are vulnerable to
unknown function names, i.e., where we only know the
function signature. There were three contracts that
seemed vulnerable to all tested functions. However,
none of the instructions to terminate the contracts were
successful. We suspect that they implemented a default
entry function. This will make them seem vulnerable
without actually being so.
For the 813 contracts that we terminated success-
fully, we analysed where their remaining balance was
sent. 76 contracts refunded their balance to us, at a
total of 247 Wei. 11 contracts sent their balances to the
null Ethereum address. The remaining 726 contracts
refunded their balances to their respective creators’ ac-
counts. Over their lifetime, these 813 contracts partici-
pated in a total of 18,506 transactions, with a combined
transaction volume of 7 Ether. Only one of them was a
contract-created contract, while all others are human-
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created contracts.
We found that we had to pay 10,693 gas on average to
terminate a contract. But even though the termination
methods were obviously unprotected, we never received
a positive refund. In other words, there is no monetary
incentive to terminate a contract.
4.2.3 Similarities between smart contracts
At this stage, it is plausible to assume that partici-
pants still experiment with the technology. As such, it is
reasonable to believe that they may also test contracts
from tutorials, or variants. We investigated this.
We chose nine particularly easy-to-find example con-
tracts and compiled each of them with and without the
optimisation flag that the compiler offers. We then cal-
culated the Levenshtein distance to all contracts on the
Ethereum blockchain. We disregarded anything beyond
a threshold of 1000 substitutions, which is equivalent to
500 ASCII characters. Table 4 shows the Levenshtein
distance (δ) for each of the example contracts, cate-
gorising the results into exact copies, minor changes
(0 < δ ≤ 100), and heavy modifications (100 < δ ≤
1000). There are 309 contracts that are exact copies of
the tutorial contracts and 2937 contracts that are very
similar to the tutorial contracts. This is a surprisingly
large number, given the small number of contract cre-
ations. As contracts from tutorials are generally small
toy examples, the higher distances may either indicate
heavy modifications or entirely new contracts that are
similarly structured.
4.2.4 Network
As described in Section 2.1, Ethereum uses a peer dis-
covery protocol that is modelled on Kademlia. Ethereum
nodes are specified by public keys, called ‘node IDs’,
which are used to secure communications.
Bootstrapping.
The official Ethereum client, geth, comes with four
hard-coded IP addresses that serve as bootstrap nodes
for the P2P network. Their public keys are also hard-
coded to prevent Eclipse attacks [7] upon initial boot-
strapping, where the attacker controls the paths to IP
addresses that are vital for the peer’s integration into
the network and tries to impersonate the bootstrap
nodes. We scanned the four IP addresses to deter-
mine their availability. The first three geth clients were
available for connection on the Ethereum standard port
(30303) via both TCP and UDP. They appeared to be
running on AWS infrastructure based in Ireland, São
Paulo, and Singapore. The fourth client appears to be
located at a German IP address and was not available
for connection on the standard Ethereum port.
Since 3 of 4 seed nodes appear to be operating on sta-
ble infrastructure (AWS), they are not likely to become
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Figure 5: Number of prefixes (y-axis) containing a cer-
tain number of peers (x-axis).
unreachable. However, denying a client access to these
three IP addresses would prevent automatic P2P boot-
strapping. Bootstrapping via DNS would be an addi-
tion; however, depending on his position in the network,
the attacker could try to modify the DNS replies.
Crawling.
We ran our crawler, described in Section 3, for three
days, starting on 2016-05-06 and ending on 2016-05-
09. We crawled from our host in Sydney, Australia,
which features a 100Mbit/s uplink to the Australian
Research Network. The hardware was a quad-core Xeon
at 2.4GHz, with 64 GB of RAM. We capped it at a
maximum of 500 concurrent FIND_NODE queries. Table
5 summarises our findings.
Over the three days, we collected 58,612 unique NodeIds
from the responses to our FIND_NODE queries. As Ethereum
clients generally do not change their NodeIds (unless
reinstalled), this gives us an estimate of the number of
peers in the network. Figure 5 shows how many 13-bit
prefixes (y-axis) contained a certain number of peers
(x-axis). Although it may seem nearly normal, there is
a long tail. One would expect a uniform distribution of
PeerIds over the address space; this does not seem to
be the case. Table 6 shows a further peculiarity: just
five IP addresses were returned for over 40,000 PeerIds,
with one IP from a German hosting provider being re-
sponsible for almost 36,000 PeerIds alone. It is hard
to determine what the reason for this might be; but
running such a high number of PeerIds on one machine
alone could be indicative of an attack on the network.
However, as Ethereum’s Kad variant is not used for for-
warding messages and there are more nodes available for
discovery, this seems not too plausible here.
Mapping the NodesIds to IP addresses and ports,
we found a total of 146,091 combinations of IP and
port, but only 26,378 distinct IPs. During the crawl,
we received valid replies from only 9215 unique IP ad-
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Tutorial Contract Size (compiled) Levenshtein Distance (δ)
δ = 0 0 < δ ≤ 100 100 < δ ≤ 1000
Ballot∗ optim 2254 7 1 3
Blind Auction∗ optim 2780 0 0 0
Safe Remote Purchase∗ optim 1368 0 0 5137
Simple Auction∗ optim 1106 1 0 6761
Coin optim 478 94 1 8815non-optim 1018 18 93 9311
Crowdsale† optim 2528 4 0 29non-optim 4094 1 0 15
Greeter† optim 734 127 47 9183non-optim 1086 39 11 6776
Mortal† optim 186 7 48 8669non-optim 432 11 7 8827
Token† optim 146 0 2728 5965non-optim 390 0 1 8906
Table 4: Levenshtein distances of contracts to publicly available tutorials (compiled form). Contracts marked with
∗ are from solidity.readthedocs.io,  from ethereum.gitbooks.io, and † from ethereum.org.
IP:Port combination 146,091
Unique IPs 26,378
Unique Ports 51,792
IPs in private ranges 1196
Table 5: Key statistics from our Ethereum network
crawl.
dresses. Many clients are not reachable from the pub-
lic Internet. In fact, 1196 IP addresses in our result
were from the ranges 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, and
10.0.0.0/8—although only 50 of them were distinct. A
total of 51,792 distinct ports were in use—once again a
sign of peers being behind NATs. The standard port,
UDP/30303, was found 26,317 times in the IP:port com-
binations. This has only a small impact on the blockchain,
however: peers that are behind NATs cannot be freely
contacted by others to receive relayed transactions. They
rely entirely on the number of connections they make
themselves. However, they are free to make many such
connections. Ideally, they should choose peers with low
latencies; this does not seem to be implemented yet,
however.
We were also interested in understanding the geo-
graphic distribution of peers in the Ethereum blockchain.
We resolved the IP addresses we had obtained with the
Maxmind GeoLite database of May 2016. Figure 4 plots
the distribution on a world map. The dominance of
Western countries, China, and Russia is evident.
4.3 Namecoin
Namecoin is different from Bitcoin in two important
IP address Unique NodeIdsregistered
78.46.49.102 35,943
24.65.141.220 1565
62.176.104.144 743
115.66.178.58 650
188.166.179.233 29
Table 6: IP address with the highest number of unique
NodeIds in Ethereum.
aspects. First, it allows merge-mining. Second, it allows
the registration of names in the blockchain.
The total number of Namecoin blocks included in our
study until our cut-off time was 285,077. Of these, 93%
were merge-mined (265,747). Given that merge-mining
was only introduced with block 19,200, this means that
since that block—mined on 8 October 2011—only 130
true Namecoin blocks were mined. All other blocks were
mined by Bitcoin miners that support merge-mining
with Namecoin. This demonstrates an enormous depen-
dency of Namecoin on Bitcoin, which is also reflected
in the number of transactions: just 1.7% (67,513) of
them are in classic Namecoin blocks while the remain-
ing 98.3% (3.9M) are in merge-mined blocks. Concern-
ing name operations, we find that more than 99% of
these are in merge-mined blocks. Table 7 summarises
this. It is fair to say that the Namecoin blockchain
presently receives almost its entire computational power
from merge-mining with Bitcoin.
The implications of this can be discussed controver-
sely. On the one hand, adding Bitcoin’s power to Name-
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Figure 4: Distribution of Ethereum node IP addresses by country
coin means that any attack on the name registration
system requires an inordinate amount of computational
resources. On the other hand, it means that Namecoin
is essentially a kind of ‘side-chain’ of Bitcoin. Since
merge-mining implies that entire Bitcoin blocks must
be written into the Namecoin blockchain, there is also
an extreme overhead of storage required in Namecoin.
Recall that the Namecoin blockchain requires 3GB on
disk, and compare this to the requirements of Peercoin.
Peercoin has a third of the transactions of Namecoin,
but requires only a sixth of the space that the Namecoin
blockchain needs. The storage overhead for Namecoin
is close to 100%.
It is instructive to inspect if Namecoin is used in some
sensible way. An initial analysis of Namecoin was pro-
vided by Kalodner et al. in [8]. The authors report
that they could only identify 28 domains that did not
seem to be registered by squatters for the purpose of
transferring or selling them later. We refer the reader
to their publication for details as we did not attempt
to replicate their study. In the following, we are more
concerned with how the usage of Namecoin has devel-
oped over time. At the time of writing, we find 644,592
registered names, and there are 6,066,222 unique ad-
dresses (public keys) in Namecoin, distributed over ap-
proximately 4M transactions.
Recall that registration of names costs fees in Name-
coin. Figure 6 shows these fees over time (plotted per
week), for each type of name operation. The high net-
work fees in the beginning for the name_firstupdate
are the cause for spikes for this operation. The costs
for registrations became very small—near 1 NMC—in
recent years. Two bumps in the plot indicate sudden
surges of registrations—but apart from this, there does
not seem to be too much activity. This is also reinforced
by the second plot in Figure 6. We used the exchange
rates provided by the Poloniex currency exchange14 in
its API to convert Namecoin values to Bitcoin and from
there to USD. One can see that investment per week
topped out at 200 USD during spikes, but has generally
been very low.
We analysed two of the spikes that were prominent
in April 2015, namely on 2015-04-11 and 2015-04-25.
Our hypothesis was that these might be renewals of
expiring names. We first checked for name_update op-
erations. We found that only 1282 of the name opera-
tions on 2015-04-11 belonged to that category, and only
365 on 2015-04-25. When checking the first_updates
for 2015-04-11, i.e., registration of a name that is not
in the system (any more), we found 10,890 names reg-
istered on that day (for 2015-04-25, we found 9049).
Of these, 170 had been previously registered, mostly
in 2014 and before. These were thus re-registrations
of expired names. The names themselves consisted of
nouns, adjectives, and a person’s first name. With
the exception of just four names, all were re-registered
again after 2015-04-11. We repeated the exercise for
2015-04-25 and found very similar numbers, both ab-
solute and relative (although the names were more en-
tertaining, e.g., thepiratesbay, starwar (sic!), and
disney-world. The conclusion that seems most likely
here is that this is a form of the squatting behaviour
that the authors of [8] had also found.
4.3.1 Network
We investigated how the Namecoin blockchain is sup-
ported by its own network. We note that the website
BitinfoCharts [3] shows roughly 200 Namecoin ‘active’
nodes, although it is not clear from the site how ‘active’
14https://poloniex.com
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Figure 6: The weekly sum of transaction fees collected for new, first_update, and name_update transactions. The
top and bottom charts show the fees in Namecoins and US Dollars respectively (only partial USD data is available
due to limitations of the source: https://www.poloniex.com/Poloniex).
is defined.
The Namecoin software is shipped with 16 hard-coded
IP addresses, plus two Onion addresses for use over Tor.
Five of them did not have reverse DNS entries. Of
the remaining 11 names, we could identify two to be
from networks for private customers. We could iden-
tify five as hosted/co-located. One IP belonged to a
mining pool. The rest were second-level domains in
COM/NET/ORG. We did not check activity for Onion
addresses.
Namecoin also hard codes five DNS names whose A
records can be queried for bootstrap nodes. Of these,
only four replied with DNS records. We queried each
domain ten times. On every occasion, two replied with
26 A records each, one with 32, and one with 17. The
overlap was relatively small, at about 10% of IP ad-
dresses that were returned by more than one source. A
round-robin or random selection was also evidently tak-
ing place as we collected new IP addresses with every
run: after two runs, we had 137 unique addresses, after
five runs 207, and after ten runs 337. We queried their
PTR records and identified about 180 IP addresses for
private customers, 4 AWS IPs, and 26 addresses from
colocation providers.
In total, we had obtained 347 seed IP addresses from
both the hard-coded and DNS seeds. Scanning these
addresses, we found 126 (36%) of them had the Name-
coin port (8334) open, but in 183 cases (53%) the IP
seemed to be behind a firewall, and in 39 cases the port
was closed (11%).
Our conclusion is that the Namecoin network prof-
its from DNS-based seeding, where servers evidently
keep track of a relatively large number of other Name-
coin clients that they reveal on subsequent DNS queries.
A significant number of revealed IP addresses seem to
be from private households, however, and only about a
12
Name operations
Blocks Transactions new firstupdate update
Normally mined 19,330 67,513 5484 2817 2624
Merge-mined 265,747 (93.2%) 3,900,753 (98.3%) 964,778 (99.4%) 867,733 (99.7%) 1,081,790 (99.8%)
Table 7: Activity in Namecoin, separated by normally mined blocks and merge-mined ones.
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Figure 7: A comparison between the number of Proof-
of-Stake and Proof-of-Work blocks in Peercoin.
third of them have an actual Namecoin client running
on that port.
4.4 Peercoin
We also briefly investigated the Peercoin blockchain.
Here, our primary interest was to determine the ex-
act usage of proof-of-stake. This concept is described
in rather vague terms in the project’s whitepaper [10].
The whitepaper—which is from 2012—also announces
that the network will gradually move to proof-of-stake.
Proof-of-work blocks will continue to play a role, but
their importance decreases. Figure 7 shows how many
blocks were mined by proof-of-work and how many were
created with proof-of-stake. The switch-over has, in
fact, happened at an early stage of the network, and
since ca. 2013 proof-of-stake blocks constitute the vast
majority.
We were also interested to see how large the net-
work was. There are currently 638,495, which is an
order of magnitude less than in Namecoin. This corre-
sponds well with the lower number of transactions that
we found for this blockchain. The website BitinfoCharts
[3] gives an estimate of just under 1000 nodes.
For bootstrapping, 15 IP addresses are hard-coded
seeds in the Peercoin client. Peercoin also ships with 7
hard-coded domain names. We queried these for their
A records, six times in total. Each time, we received
2 NXDOMAIN. Four times, a domain yielded a SERV-
FAIL, although it did respond in two cases. This was
one of the domains that we identified to return IP ad-
dresses in a round-robin fashion. After two tries, we
had obtained 71 unique IP addresses. This rose to 92
after four tries and 100 after six tries. The vast ma-
jority (around 30 addresses each try) were provided by
just two seed domains. Together with the hard-coded
addresses, we now had 113 seed IPs. For 95 of them,
we could obtain the reverse DNS entries. 69% of them
belonged to customers of ISPs; of the rest, almost half
could be clearly identified as co-located servers. The re-
mainder were second-level domains where it was unclear
how they were hosted. We found one IP address that be-
longed to the cryptocurrency exchange Nixmoney. We
scanned all 113 seed IPs to test whether they responded
on the Peercoin port (TCP/9901). 82 had the port
open, in 26 cases it was filtered (indicating the presence
of a firewall), and in the remaining cases closed. None
of the 15 hard-coded IPs responded to our probes on
Peercoin port (12 filtered, 3 closed).
Compared to Namecoin, Peercoin bootstrapping de-
pends evidently more on transient setups by private
users. For all practical purposes, bootstrapping into
Peercoin is limited to just two domains, making Peer-
coin the network with the poorest bootstrapping mech-
anism.
5. SUMMARY
In this paper, we have studied the characteristics of
modern blockchains. We chose three representatives of
these: Ethereum as the first and very successful blockchain
that allows to run Turing-complete programs on the
blockchain, Namecoin as an attempt to base a name
registration service on Bitcoin technology, and Peercoin
as the first blockchain to make use of a proof-of-stake
mechanism. We found that Ethereum is by far the most
active blockchain gaining in popularity. However, most
transactions are still transfers from one account to an-
other, and smart contracts are only slowly created. A
good part of them is based on widely available tutori-
als. Furthermore, there are some security risks involved
when defensive programming guidelines are not adhered
to—although there does not seem to be a strong finan-
cial motivation for an attacker yet. We also found curi-
ous transaction patterns that may be used to hide the
balance of accounts. Ethereum nodes are distributed
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over the globe, with particularly many nodes in Western
countries, but also in Russia and China. In the case of
Namecoin, we found that the blockchain shows very lit-
tle activity. Previously reported name-squatting seems
to be going on, but even this is at a low rate, despite
very cheap registration costs. Peercoin, meanwhile, has
switched to proof-of-stake long ago. Despite there be-
ing no formal analysis of its proof-of-stake mechanism,
it does move considerable assets around, albeit two or-
ders of magnitude less than Bitcoin. Both Namecoin
and Peercoin have very few clients; we showed further-
more that their bootstrapping process relies on unavail-
able seed nodes.
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